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This thesis started as an optimization problem using the cutting-stock algorithm applied 
to underground power cable pulling to minimize scrap and reel carrier movements.   
 
It then morphed into a study of power component lifetime modeling and the reliability 
impacts of various levels of equipment replacement.  Some spatial load forecasting using 
various regression models was going to be done for good measure. 
 
Circuit breaker operational failures called, but things still didn’t feel quite right. 
 
After years of tortuous capital budgeting cycles, the work finally coalesced into its proper 
form. 
 









Electric utilities face constant pressure from regulators to defer rate increases 
while simultaneously maintaining or improving levels of service.  Capital spending 
projects are coming under increasing scrutiny as the costs of the projects can no longer be 
assumed to be rolled into projected rate increases.  At the same time, utility customers 
expect near uninterrupted service to their homes and businesses.  Electric lines and 
components that make up the power system are getting older and are reaching or have 
exceeded an assumed end-of-life.   
Planners at these utilities need a way to prioritize constrained budget dollars 
across seemingly disparate transmission, substation, and distribution work areas.  This 
thesis provides a framework for quantifying the reliability impacts of these different 
projects as measured by Customer-Minutes of Interruption (CMI) avoided.  Transmission 
lines are modeled as continuous time Markov processes with common-cause failure 
modes.  The parallel-series configuration of the substation and failure modes of its 
components is evaluated using Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).  Circuit 
breaker operational failures are evaluated and Poisson process models are fitted by 
interrupting medium.  The transmission and substation systems are then evaluated as a 
decoupled equivalent source per feeder in series with the distribution system.  Competing 
projects impacts are evaluated and prioritized based upon dollars spent per CMI avoided 
($/CMI).   
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CHAPTER 1   
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Power System Overview 
 
 The electric power grid has been described as the most complicated machine on 
Earth.  Conceptually it is very simple; an illustration of a traditional system is provided in 
Figure 1.1 (Brown, 2009).  Power is traditionally generated at large coal- or natural gas-
fired, hydroelectric, or nuclear generating stations generally remotely located from 
population centers.  The voltage is then stepped up at generation substations to a voltage 
suitable for long distance transmission.  Large steel towers support high voltage 
transmission circuits emanating from these generation substations and span miles to large 
transmission substations.  The transmission substations allow for reconfiguration and/or 
voltage transformation.   
 Transmission towers then connect the transmission substations, via what is 
sometimes referred to as subtransmission circuits, to distribution substations located 
closer to the loads serviced where the voltage is stepped back down to what is generally 
referred to as “primary” distribution voltage.  Feeder circuits on wood poles or 
underground cables branch out from the distribution substations to the customer where 
distribution transformers step the voltage down to “secondary” distribution voltage 
appropriate for use by the customer.   
 This thesis will focus only on the transmission feeds to the distribution substation, 
the distribution substation itself, and the primary distribution system.  It is assumed that 
the sources feeding the transmission system are perfectly reliable.  These transmission, 








Figure 1.1 Traditional Power System 
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1.1.1 Transmission Subsystem Overview 
 
The purpose of the transmission system is to connect far flung generation 
facilities to load centers.  In most cases, lattice steel towers or tubular steel poles support 
transmission circuits over long distances, although underground transmission circuits 
(HPFF, HPGF, extruded EPR or XLPE dielectric) do exist, generally in urban centers and 
span much shorter distances due to the significant installation cost.  The voltage level 
(phase-to-phase voltages will be used throughout) is very high – typical voltage levels in 
the United States include 69 kV, 115 kV, 138 kV, 161 kV, 230 kV, 345 kV, 500 kV, 765 
kV, and 1100 kV (Brown 2009).   
Transmission circuits terminate at switching stations, transmission substations, or 
distribution substations.  Transmission switching stations allow for transmission circuits 
to be reconfigured and generally increase operational flexibility.  Transmission 
substations step down the voltage from one transmission voltage to another.  For 
example, a 500 kV Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) transmission line is stepped down 
to 161 kV at a TVA distributor’s transmission substation, which would be located closer 
to the loads serviced.  Distribution substations generally have two transmission feeds for 
improved reliability.  These distribution substations will be explored further in the next 
section. 
1.1.2 Substation Subsystem Overview 
 
The main purpose of the distribution substation is to transform the voltage from 
transmission levels to primary distribution levels, generally from 12 to 35 kV.  It also 
allows for some feeder reconfiguration in the event of some anomaly.  Figure 1.2 shows 
an example of a very simple substation one-line diagram and elevation.  This is a 161-23 
kV single transformer bank, three feeder substation with a T-tapped transmission feed.  
The incoming 161 kV transmission line feeds through a disconnect switch which cannot 
break load but is meant to isolate and serve as a visual confirmation of open circuit.  The 





Figure 1.2 Substation One Line Diagram and Elevation 
 
 5 
The power transformer steps the voltage down from 161 kV to 23 kV and feeds a 
common 23 kV operating bus.  Tapped off of this bus are the three feeder breakers with 
non-load break disconnect switches on both the source and load sides.  The feeder 
breakers are meant to protect the substation in the event of faults on the distribution side.  
Feeder getaways, generally underground or sometimes overhead, radiate out from the 
substation to begin the distribution system.   
This particular arrangement is particularly susceptible to reliability problems in 
that the components are arranged in series.  The failure of any single component will 
result in loss of service for all customers fed from this substation.  It has been estimated 
that approximately 20% of customer interruptions originate at the substation and 
transmission level (Billinton & Jonnavitihula, 1996).  Although the example in Figure 1.2 
is an actual substation in operation in the Southeastern U.S., most substation 
arrangements (including the model to be used in this thesis) have a much more involved 
parallel/series configuration with looped transmission feeds.  This allows for more 
flexible and reliable operation at the expense of higher cost. 
1.1.3 Distribution Subsystem Overview 
 
 The distribution system connects the distribution substation with the distribution 
transformers, which then provide service to the customer at the service entrance.  Figure 
1.3, taken from Brown (2009), shows an example four feeder distribution system.  
Generally, the feeders get away from the substation underground in concrete-encased 
duct banks and rise up to start the main backbone feeder overhead on wood poles.  Fused 
lateral taps, either 1-Ø, 2-Ø, or 3-Ø, branch off of the backbone feeder to distribution 
transformers.  Normally closed sectionalizing switches allow for sectionalization along 
the length of the backbone; normally open switches between adjacent feeders allow for 
load transfer.  In traditional distribution systems, these switches are operated manually.  
With the advent of Distributed Automation (DA) technologies, components including 




 The distribution system in Figure 1.3 represents a typical scenario, though it 
should be noted that there are many other options available.  The same can be said of the 
system design on the secondary side of the distribution transformer, particularly in 
regards to secondary networks, but these secondary arrangements will not be addressed 




1.2 Thesis Goals and Approach 
  
Power system planners face a bevy of choices for system improvement and a 
limited amount of dollars.  Does it make sense to spend millions of dollars building a new 
transmission line with large lattice steel towers or should those budget dollars be spent on 
Figure 1.3 Typical Distribution System 
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replacing aging power transformers?  Should new “smart grid” technologies such as 
automated switches or automated metering take a higher priority?  If a particular 
underground power cable configuration has been a problem, how much cable should be 
replaced and which locations are the most effective for improving reliability? 
Questions such as these arise frequently and are only exacerbated by the fact that, 
in many utility organizational structures, the work groups requesting budget dollars for 
these projects have little or no overlap.  These work groups exist as tiny islands trying to 
maximize the portion of the total budget allocated to them.  The projects that these work 
groups request can vary widely and are very difficult to compare and prioritize.  It is 
ultimately the responsibility of system planners, budget personnel, and executives to 
assemble and approve projects in the form of a capital budget.  The main goal of this 
thesis is to provide a framework to assist these planners in efficiently allocating scarce 
budget dollars to maximize the reliability benefit. 
It should be noted that there are obviously projects that will be done regardless of 
the reliability impact.  Substations have to be built in order to meet projected load 
growth.  Transmission lines and distribution circuits will emanate from these substations.  
Customers will request additional service or the relocation of existing services.  These 
types of projects certainly exist but will not be further addressed in this work. 
This project was in part inspired by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) Pre-Disaster Mitigation (PDM) grant program.  The basic idea behind this 
program is that FEMA found it was more cost-effective to address vulnerabilities through 
various mitigation activities prior to a disaster than it did to recover from that particular 
disaster.  In the program, individual states compete for varying yearly amounts of grant 
dollars appropriated by Congress.  States submit wide-ranging projects for consideration, 
such as flood mitigation, seismic retrofits, wildfire mitigation, tornado safe rooms, etc.  
All of these projects are evaluated on their technical merit and then compared with each 
other based upon their individual Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR), simply the project benefits 
divided by the associated costs.  Projects with high BCRs receive grant dollars; 
competing projects with lower BCRs are not funded.  What is most interesting is that all 
of these projects from such different categories are evaluated on a common basis, the 
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BCR.  This thesis applies these ideas to competing power system projects where the 
benefits are defined by the reliability improvements at the expense of constrained budget 
dollars. 
1.3 Thesis Outline 
 
 This thesis will begin with a discussion on how power system reliability is 
defined; there are, perhaps surprisingly to the layperson, quite a few different ways a 
utility can measure reliability.  Various indices and costs will be explained with a 
subsequent discussion of the pros and cons of each choice.  The conversation will then 
segue into the background and concepts behind calculating the reliability of the 
respective portions of the power system – specifically the transmission, substation, and 
distribution systems.  The transmission and substation system will be tied together with 
the distribution system through decoupled composite modeling.  The background 
discussion will conclude with the method of comparing potential projects through the use 
of reliability benefit-cost analysis.   
 These concepts will then be applied to a hybrid system consisting of an actual 
transmission and substation system feeding a modified test system.  The transmission 
system and substation come from a utility in the Southeastern United States that was 
energized in 1974.  The distribution system comes from a widely used educational test 
system (Allan et al., 1991), modified appropriately to assist in the discussion.  Circuit 
breaker operational failures will be modeled by interrupting medium through the use of 
Mean Cumulative Functions (MCFs); Poisson process models will be fitted 
appropriately.  Other component modeling will be from appropriate industry sources.   
 The concepts will be applied to the hybrid system using the component 
information for a base case and the reliability results will then be calculated.  This will 
then be followed by five different case studies including automating switches, replacing 
feeder breakers, replacing 3-Ø underground feeder cable, replacing 1-Ø Underground 
Residential Distribution (URD) cable, and finally 161 kV transmission system 
improvements to alleviate common-cause failure modes.  The intent behind the choice of 
 
 9 
these particular case studies is to provide at least one project option from the 
transmission, substation, and distribution systems.   
 The reliability of each case study will then be compared with the base case.  The 
change in reliability in concert with the project cost for each project option will enable 
the reliability benefit-cost evaluations.  All of the projects can then be ranked according 
to decreasing benefit-cost ratios.  The projects are then grouped cumulatively, without 
interaction, by decreasing benefit cost to allow the utility to optimally choose a set of 
projects based upon a constrained capital budget allocation.  
 
 10 
CHAPTER 2  




2.1 Reliability and Reliability Cost Evaluation 
 
What is the reliability benefit of a project?  Is it reducing the frequency that 
customers experience outages?  The duration of the outages?  How about reducing the 
number of customers that experience an outage of a certain duration every year?  Are all 
customers the same?  That is to say, should a residential customer be treated the same as 
a large industrial customer that employs thousands of people?  Reliability, as formally 
defined, is a number – specifically, it is the probability that a unit/device/system will be 
operating at some specified time (or cycles, miles, etc.) under stated design conditions.  
In this section, the various ways these ideas apply to power systems will be quantified 
formally and discussed in turn. 
 
2.1.1 Power Industry Standards 
 
The power industry uses a veritable alphabet soup of acronyms to measure the 
reliability of its systems.  This section will focus only on the ones used most commonly. 
Customer interruptions can be classified as either momentary or sustained.  IEEE 1366 
places a threshold value of five minutes for the maximum momentary interruption before 
it is classified as a sustained outage.  A momentary interruption could be caused by 
strong wind blowing a tree limb into a line, a recloser opening, the limb blowing clear, 
and the recloser holding at reset.  Sustained outages are caused by short circuits and are 
the focus of this work.  It should be noted, however, that there is an entire set of 
reliability indices devoted to the measurement of momentary interruptions, but they will 
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not be addressed further.  The following are the most commonly used reliability indices 
with respective definitions taken from IEEE 1366: 
 
System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI): 
       
                                 
                    
 
∑    
∑  
      
   
  
  
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI): 
       
∑                              
                    
 
∑    
∑  




Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI): 
       
∑                              
                                 
 
∑    
∑    
          
where: 
λi =expected annual failure rate and load point i 
Ni = number of customers at load point i 
Ui = expected annual outage duration at load point i 
 
SAIFI measures the average number of sustained interruptions an average 
customer would see per year.  SAIDI measures the total expected duration of sustained 
interruption hours an average customer would experience per year.  CAIDI measures how 
long it takes, on average, to address a given sustained interruption by the utility. 
Several things should be pointed out.  SAIFI, SAIDI, and CAIDI treat all 
customers – residential, commercial, and industrial – equally.  A single home 
experiencing an outage that spoils food in the refrigerator is equivalent to a large 
industrial customer that could lose hundreds of thousands of dollars in that same outage 
from a bad manufacturing cycle.  For a constant (or functionally constant given low 
growth rate changes) customer base, the only way to improve SAIFI is to reduce the 
number of interruptions.  SAIDI can be improved by either reducing the number of 
interruptions or by improving the duration or response to an interruption.  It also should 
be noted that SAIFI & SAIDI, while typically used globally at the system level, can also 
be used locally at the substation, feeder, tap level, etc.   
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This thesis will also use an alternate reliability measure, CMI, which is Customer-
Minutes Interrupted.  It is simply the numerator of SAIDI without normalizing for a 
certain customer set.  Its use is convenient for comparing projects that affect different 
numbers of customers.     
2.1.2 Minimization of Societal Costs 
 Societal costs of reliability consist of the sum of customer and utility costs.  
Brown (2009) presents a set of generic customer, utility, and total cost curves versus 
reliability as shown in Figure 2.1.  The minimum point on the total cost curve represents 






The societal costs associated with an outage consist of the sum of the outage cost 
to the customer and to the utility.  Consider a breaker operational failure scenario, using 
Figure 1.2 as a reference, in which one of the feeder breaker trips open and then fails to 
close.  Operations will determine that the breaker has in fact failed open.  A 
troubleshooter will be dispatched to transfer load by manually operating appropriate 
switches (i.e., by manually opening a switch just outside station on the load side of the 
breaker and then by manually closing a tie switch on an adjacent feeder with sufficient 
transfer capacity).  All of the customers on that feeder will experience an outage during 
Figure 2.1 Total Societal Costs 
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this manual switching routine; customers not able to be restored by switching will 
experience an outage minimally equal to the duration of breaker repair.  Customers will 
experience a cost associated with the outage and the utility will lose revenue during the 
outage.  Breaker maintenance crews will be called out to repair the breaker.  After the 
breaker is repaired, the system is then returned back to its initial state by another round of 
switching.  The total cost of an outage due to failure can therefore be summarized as 
follows: 
 
                  
      
         
      
          
         
      
       
       
  
 
The customer costs associated with an outage obviously depend on many factors.  
The cost of a one-hour outage to a residential customer is obviously much lower than to a 
large commercial or industrial customer employing hundreds or thousands of employees 
with annual demands of thousands of kW.  Outage costs also depend on outage duration, 
season, time of day, etc.  These costs have been quantified in Customer Damage 
Functions (CDFs) by Lawton et al. (2003).  This study, which built on the Electric Power 
Research Institute (EPRI) “Outage Cost Estimation Guidebook” (1995), used 24 datasets 
recorded from 12 major electric utilities across the United States during the period from 
1989-2002.  The datasets used customer cost surveys to estimate outage costs.  
Residential customers were asked how much they were Willing to Pay (WTP) to avoid 
outages of differing characteristics (duration, season, time of year, etc.); commercial and 
industrial customers were also asked to estimate their direct costs associated with outages 
of differing characteristics.  Ultimately, CDFs were modeled based upon three distinct 
customer types – residential, small Commercial and Industrial (C&I; those with <1 MW 
peak demand), and large C&I (>1 MW peak demand).  These CDFs are now presented 
here for a generic utility in the Southeastern United States.  A supplemental file to this 





Residential Customer Damage Function:  
ln(y) = c0 +c1x1 +c2x1
2 +c3x2 +c4x3 +c5x5 +c6x5 +c7x6 +c8x7 +c9x8 
where: 
y = Outage cost for a generic residential customer 
ci = fitted regression coefficient (File 1, cdf_coefficients.xls) 
x1 = outage duration (hours) 
x2 = morning indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x3 = night indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x4 = weekend indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x5 = winter indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x6 = Southeast indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x7 = annual MWh 
x8 = ln(annual household income, $) 
 
This model therefore predicts that a generic residential customer in the Southeast 
U.S. (average annual usage of 14,300 kWh; annual income $40,180) is willing to pay 
~$4.38 to avoid a 1-hour duration outage on a summer weekday afternoon.   
 
The CDF for commercial & industrial customers represents direct costs associated 
with an outage.  The CDF for small Commercial & Industrial customers (<1 MW annual 
peak demand) is presented here:  
 
Small Commercial & Industrial (<1 MW peak demand) Customer Damage Function: 
ln(y) = c0 +c1x1 +c2x1
2 +c3x2 +c4x3 +c5x1x3 +c6x4 +c7x5 +c8x6 +c9x7  
where: 
y = Outage cost for a generic small C&I customer 
ci = fitted regression coefficient (File 1, cdf_coefficients.xls) 
x1 = outage duration (hours) 
x2 = number of employees 
x3 = annual kWh 
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x4 = morning indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x5 = night indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x6 = weekend indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x7 = winter indicator variable (0 or 1) 
 
This model therefore predicts that a generic small commercial or industrial 
customer (<1 MW peak demand) experiences direct costs of ~$1,200 for a 1-hour 
duration outage on a summer weekday afternoon.  The average small C&I customer from 
the study had an annual kWh usage of ~12,000 kWh and ~120 employees.  Generally, 
most C&I customers do not employ 120 people; however, the model isn’t as sensitive to 
changes in the number of employees as to other factors.  For example, changing the 
number of employees from 120 to 20 while holding all other factors constant reduces the 
1-hr outage cost listed above from ~$1,200 to ~$1,000.   
 
The CDF for large Commercial & Industrial customers (>1 MW peak demand) is 
presented here: 
Large Commercial & Industrial Customer Damage Function 
ln(y) = c0 +c1x1 +c2x1
2 +c3x2 +c4x3 +c5x1x3 +c6x4 +c7x5 +c8x6 +c9x7 
where: 
y = Outage cost for a generic large C&I customer 
ci = fitted regression coefficient (File 1, cdf_coefficients.xls) 
x1 = outage duration (hours) 
x2 = number of employees 
x3 = annual kWh 
x4 = morning indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x5 = night indicator variable (0 or 1) 
x6 = weekend indicator variable (0 or 1) 




This model therefore predicts that a generic large commercial or industrial 
customer experiences direct costs of ~$8,200 for a 1-hour duration outage on a summer 
weekday afternoon.  The average large C&I customer from the study had an annual usage 
of 17.5 million kWh and had 373 employees. 
 
It should be noted that these CDFs are for generic customer types only and do not 
reflect the actual, specific costs to an individual customer.   
 
2.1.3 Benefits & Drawbacks of Each Method 
 
 Choosing between using a standard power industry reliability index or societal 
cost minimization for project prioritization ultimately reflects a utility philosophical 
choice.  There are issues with each method.  Brown (2009) collects and presents the main 
arguments against minimizing societal costs.  First is the obvious problem that cost 
surveys present.  It is highly unlikely that a residential customer would actually be 
willing to pay ~$5 to avoid an outage; similarly, C&I customers will overstate their 
outage costs, particularly if those customers are aware that reliability improvement 
projects will be based upon the survey results.  Second, a business physically located in 
an area where reliability improvements are not cost effective by this method could 
effectively subsidize the profits of a competitor located in an area where reliability 
improvements are cost effective as both customers pay the same rate.  Finally, customers 
who can make more cost effective reliability improvements to their own facilities 
(emergency generators, uninterruptible power supplies, etc.) obviously prefer that the 
utility make improvements on the utility side to address the problem, often at much 
higher cost.  Conversely, it seems unreasonable to equate a residential and C&I customer 
outage experience.  Ultimately, Brown argues against minimizing societal cost and 
encourages setting reasonable reliability standards and making customers pay for 
reliability improvements above these minimum standards.  This thesis will present the 
results from both methods but ultimately will use $/CMI as the basis for comparison. 
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2.2 System Reliability Evaluation 
 
A primer on the methods used in reliability analysis is now presented.  The 
forthcoming sections rely heavily and use conceptual examples from Billinton (1992), 
Billinton (2012) and Billinton et al. (1978).  First, an introduction to discrete Markov 
chains using a simple two-state system is presented.  Building on this section, an 
overview of continuous-time Markov processes with multiple components and multiple 
states follows.  A discussion of series-parallel arrangements will then follow. 
2.2.1 Discrete Markov Chains 
 
The basic idea behind Markov techniques is that components or systems reside in 
and transition between states.  These transitions can occur in discrete steps or vary 
continuously; however the transition rate between states is constant (i.e., a stationary 
process).  Also key to Markov techniques is that the future state of the component 
depends only on the current state (i.e., memoryless).  Consider the simple two-state 
system shown in Figure 2.2.  The two states – State 1 and State 2 – could be “up” or 








Assume initially that the system shown in Figure 2.2 is in State 1 (up).    It will 
transition to State 2 (down) with probability of ½, or it will remain in State 1 with 
probability of ½.  What is important is that the sum of the probabilities is unity (i.e., the 
system either remains in its current state or transitions to some other state).  Similarly, the 
system will remain in State 2 with probability of ¾ or transition to State 1 with 
1 ½ 2 ¾ 
½ 
¼ 
Figure 2.2 Two State System 
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probability of ¼.  If we were to transition forward multiple steps,  we could diagram the 

















































































































Figure 2.3 Tree Diagram 
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The system is assumed to initially be in State 1; the tree diagram represents four 
time steps into the future with resulting path probabilities (given in 128ths).  Again, the 
total probability of being in any state is 1(128/128) as required.   
 
Table 2.1 below sums the probabilities of being in either State 1 or State 2 for 
each time interval.  These are then plotted in Figure 2.4 with blue being State 1. 
   
Table 2.1 State Probabilities 
Time Interval State 1 State 2 
1 1/2 = 0.5 1/2 = 0.5 
2 3/8 = 0.375 5/8 = 0.625 
3 11/32 = 0.344 21/32 = 0.656 
4 43/128 = 0.336 85/128 = 0.664 






What is key here is that the system reaches a steady-state probability of being in a 
certain state.  It is also important to note that the system reaches these steady-state 
conditions regardless of the starting condition (“up” or “down”).  This behavior is 


















Figure 2.4 Steady-State Probabilities 
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The simple two state system in Figure 2.2 can be represented in matrix notation as shown 























where Pij = probability of making a transition to state j after a time interval given that it 
was in state i at the beginning of the time interval. 
 
Matrix P shows that the probability of staying in State 1 given that it is currently 
in State 1 is ½; the probability of moving to State 1 given that it is currently in State 2 is 
¼ and so forth.  This is known as a stochastic transitional probability matrix.  The rows of 
the matrix can be read as the “from” state and moving along the columns to the right can 
be read as “to” state.  
 
If we were to move one time interval into the future, we would simply multiply 

















































This can be interpreted as the probability of being in State 1 after one time 
interval given that it started in State 1 is 3/8; the probability of being in State 2 after one 
time interval given that it started in State 1 is 5/8.  These results match those in Table 2.1 
and Figure 2.4.  The second row of the above matrix gives the results that would be found 
if we were to assume that the initial condition was State 2.  If the initial starting condition 
is assumed to start in State 1 represented by a vector then the above can similarly be 
rewritten as: 
 
 01(0) P  
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and the above narrative can similarly be rewritten as: 
 









 2PPP  
 
This then leads to the description of the system n-steps into the future as: 
 
nPPP (0)(n)   
 
Consider again that what we are interested in is the steady-state behavior of the system.  
Ergodic systems can be written as follows: 
 
ππP   
 
where π represents the steady-state probability vector and P represents the stochastic 
transition probability matrix.  The idea behind the above equation is that over time, no 
matter how many time intervals projected into the future the same result will be obtained.  
This can then be reduced as follows: 
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These are equivalent resulting in one equation and two unknowns.  Remember that the 
sum of the probabilities must be unity, so our second equation is: 
 
121  ππ . 
 












This result is consistent with those given in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.4. 
 
2.2.2 Continuous Markov Processes 
 
The same ideas in the previous section can now be applied to systems where the 
transitions (i.e., failures and repairs) can be associated with a probability distribution.  As 
the transition rates for Markov processes must be constant, this implies that these failure 
and repair times are distributed exponentially.  Consider again the single repairable 
component two-state system as before but now with failure rate λ and repair rate µ as 








Recall that the density function for the exponential distribution is f(t)=λe
-λt
.  So the 






















where λ = 1/MTTF (Mean Time To Failure)and µ = 1/MTTR (Mean Time To Repair).  
The time-dependent probabilities of being found in the up or down state are given by 



























































Figure 2.5 Two-State Continuous Model 
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It should be noted that the stochastic transitional probability matrix for the system in 
Figure 2.5 can be setup as before with the introduction of a small time interval Δt, where 
the probability of failure in the interval Δt is λΔt and the probability of no failure in the 
interval is 1-λΔt.  It should be noted that the interval Δt is so small that the probability of 
two or more transitions in the interval is negligible.  Billinton (1992) shows that the Δt 
term drops out, ultimately reducing to the equations above.   
 
We can now extend these ideas to two repairable component system, with each 
component having two states.  It is assumed that the component failures are independent 
– i.e., a failure of one component has no effect on the other component.  This system 







For a series system, the up (Availability) state would be State 1 and the down 





















Figure 2.6 Two Component Repairable System 
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sum of the probabilities of States 2, 3 & 4).  For parallel systems, as in the case of the 
multiple transmission feeds that we are interested in, the down state is State 4 and the up 
states are States 1, 2 & 3. 
 
The parallel transmission feeds for each substation can now be modeled as above, where 
the “component” is a transmission circuit with respective failure rate and repair rate.  In 
this instance we would only be interested in State 4 as both circuits would be down and 
the station would be completely outaged.   
 

































As before, we are interesting in finding the steady-state probability vector π: 
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For systems with multiple components, the resulting number of states makes the use of 
Markov techniques unwieldy.  For example, a system with five components, each with 
only an “up” and a “down” state, will result in 2
5
 = 32 different system states.  As such, 
approximations using these techniques as a base are necessary. 
2.2.3 Series Systems 
 
Recall from Section 2.2.2 that the single component up (available) state 

















Consider the system given in Figure 2.7 showing a two-component series system and an 







For the two systems to be equivalent: 
λ1r1 λ2r2 λsrs = 
















And the equivalent transition rate λs = λ1 + λ2.  Using an equivalent average repair time, 









212122111   
 
where the λ1λ2r1r2 term is usually much, much smaller than either λ1r1 or λ2r2 and is 







 2211   
 









which is usually expressed in failures/year.  This can be interpreted to mean that the 
failure of the system results from the failure of any component.  The system 










where Us is usually expressed as hours per year (h/yr).  The average repair time can 









where rs is usually expressed in hours. 
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2.2.4 Parallel Systems 
 
 Recall from Section 2.2.2 that the single component down (Unavailable) state 

















Consider the system given in Figure 2.8 showing a two-component parallel system and an 























and the equivalent transition rate from the down state is μp = μ1 + μ2.  This can 








































and since λ1r1 and λ2r2 are usually <<1, this reduces to : 
 
)()()( 2121212121 rrrrp    
 
This can be interpreted to mean that the system will fail if component 2 fails while 
component 1 is being repaired subsequent to failure or component 1 fails while 
component 2 is being repaired subsequent to failure.  The system unavailability, Up, is 
equal to the sum of products of the down state frequency and repair times, i.e.: 
 
2121 rrrU ppp    
 
This logic can be extended to systems with more than two components in parallel. 
 
2.2.5 Combined Series-Parallel Systems 
 
 Many systems have configurations involving components in both series and 
parallel or even more complex bridge networks.  Network reduction is commonly used 
for series-parallel systems.  This method involves combining or reducing the 
combinations of the system that are in series or parallel until the system can be expressed 
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as a single equivalent component.  This process and the resulting equations can become 
quite involved and tedious for larger, complex systems.  Another drawback to this 
method is that it is sometimes not obvious which component (or set of components) 
contributes the most to overall system unreliability. 
 A method that does make clear the magnitude of the unreliability contribution of 
each component or set of components is Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).  
The failure modes of the components contribute to minimum cut sets, which are defined 
as the “set of system components which, when failed, cause failure of the system” 
(Billinton & Allan, 1992).  In many power systems, these minimum cut sets can be 
evaluated by inspection, although algorithms do exist for their development from more 
complex systems.  Because each minimum cut set guarantees system failure, each of the 
cut sets can be thought of as equivalent blocks in series.  Each respective cut set is 
evaluated for its failure rate, repair time, and unavailability using the series/parallel 
methods as described in previous sections depending on the components in the cut set.  
As the cut sets are in series, the overall system failure rate and unavailability is calculated 
as for a series system. 
 It should be noted that this method provides an upper bound to system 
unreliability.  The reason is that the FMEA approach uses the approximation as discussed 
in previous sections; the lower bound can be found by subtracting the product of the 
event unreliability pairs.  This is generally unnecessary as the difference is negligible if 
λr << 1 for each component, as is usually the case in power system evaluation. 
 As a simple example of the ideas expressed in this section, consider the series-













Using network reduction, components 2 & 3 are first reduced into an equivalent 












































































Similarly, the system can be evaluated using FMEA.  The minimum cut sets of 
the system are {1} and {2,3}.  The failure rate, repair time, and unavailability are 
















Table 2.2 System Reliability of Figure 2.9 using FMEA 
Min Cut Set λ (f/yr) r (hrs) U (hrs/yr) 
1 0.25 20 5 
2 and 3 6.42 x 10
-4
 3.33 0.00214 
Total 0.250642 19.96 5.00214 
 
where λtotal=∑λi; Utotal= =∑Ui; rtotal=Utotal/λtotal 
 
As can be seen from Table 2.2, the results from both methods are the same.  
FMEA, however, clearly shows that component 1 dominates the system unreliability, as 
would be expected as it is a series component. 
2.3 Transmission System Assessment 
 
Transmission lines will be evaluated in this thesis as repairable components in 
accordance with the Markov techniques described in Section 2.2.2, with one main 
difference.  An additional failure event, which results in both lines being down known as 
a common-cause failure mode, will be added.  It is not uncommon for a single 
transmission tower to carry multiple transmission circuits.  The loss of a single tower due 
to vehicle impacts, flood, etc., will therefore result in the loss of both circuits.  The IEEE 
Subcommittee on the Application of Probability Methods recognized the importance of 
this failure mode and commissioned a Task Force on its study (IEEE 1976).  The Task 
Force defined a common-cause failure as “an event having a single external cause with 
multiple failure events where the events are not consequences of each other.”   
 









The common-cause failure mode is accounted for in Figure 2.10 by λc.  This is the 
model that will be used in the forthcoming analysis.  It is important to note, therefore, 
what this model says and what it does not say.  It assumes that the transmission lines are 
not identical; each line has its own distinct failure and repair characteristics.  It also 
assumes that there is a common-cause failure mode that will cause both lines to be 
outaged at once.  This common-cause failure mode is distinct from a simultaneous 
failure, λ1λ2, of the two lines independently.  It does not say, in the case that there is a 
common-cause failure, that both lines would be able to be repaired at exactly the same 
time (i.e., a common-cause repair).  It assumes that each line would have to be repaired 
separately.   
 

























































As before, we are interesting in finding the steady-state probability vector π: 
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2.4 Substation System Assessment 
 
The concepts introduced in the previous sections will now be extended to the 
substation system.  Certain components, particularly circuit breakers, in the substation 
have different modes of failure which have to be taken into account in the FMEA 
analysis.  Consider again the substation shown in Figure 1.2, which is reproduced here in 





Assume initially that all of the breakers operate properly.  At load point A, a failure on 
feeder 9 will be cleared by opening breaker 6 (as well as feeder 10 failure cleared by 
breaker 7) so there will be no interruption.  Failures of the transmission line (component 
1), high-side breaker (component 2), busbar (component 4), feeder breaker (component 
5), or feeder (component 8) will result in an outage at load point A equal to the repair 














Figure 2.11 Simplified One-Line 
Diagram of Figure 1.2 Substation 
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open, and load point A will experience an outage equal to the time it takes to open the 
disconnect switches on either side of the breaker and reclose breaker 2 (see Figure 1.2).  
This switching time would include the time it takes for SCADA to note the breaker 
operation, a substation crew to be called out to the site, time to troubleshoot the problem, 
and then perform the isolation. 
 Generally speaking, components can either fail open or short.  Open circuits do 
not result in breaker operation; short circuits require breaker operation.  The total failure 
rate would therefore be the sum of the open circuit failure rate and the short circuit failure 
rate.  For nearly all substation components, there is practically no open circuit failure 
mode so open circuits can be ignored.  Circuit breakers, on the other hand, can both fail 
open and short circuit.  If feeder breaker 5 in Figure 2.11 fails open, only load point A 
will experience an outage (equal to the repair time).  A short circuit of that same breaker 
obviously results in the situation previously discussed.  These switching actions have 
been generalized and modeled as active and passive failures (Billinton & Allan, 1996).   
2.4.1 Active and Passive Failures 
 
 Switching actions in substations can be modeled using a three-state model.  The 
three states illustrated in Figure 2.12 are: (1) the operating or “up” state (U); (2) the 
switching state in which a component has failed but switching action has not taken place 
(S); and (3) the repair state in which the fault has been isolated by switching but the 












For open circuit failures that do not require switching, this reduces to a two-state model 






Assuming that the repair process is equivalent allows for the models to merge into an 







where the failure modes are described as active or passive failure modes.  These failure 
modes are defined (Billinton & Allan, 1996) as: 
Passive Failure: “A component failure mode that does not cause operation of protection 
breakers and therefore does not have an impact on the remaining healthy components.  







Figure 2.13 Two-State Component 
Model 




Active Failure: “A component failure mode that causes the operation of the primary 
protection zone around the failed component and can therefore cause the removal of other 
healthy components and branches from service.  The actively failed component is 
isolated and the protection breakers are reclosed.”  Service is restored to some or all of 
the load points and the faulted component is repaired or replaced.   
The total failure rate would then be the sum of the passive and active failure rate.  
As discussed previously, for most components the passive failure rate will be zero.   
It is also possible for the circuit breakers to malfunction when required to operate.  
This is known as a “stuck” breaker condition.  If there is a fault on the backbone feeder 
and the breaker fails to clear, the high-side breaker will need to trip to isolate the fault.  
This stuck breaker condition is different than the active/passive failure mode described 
previously in that there is an initiating event (e.g., a feeder fault) that calls on the breaker 
to operate, whereas the active/passive failure modes assume some internal misoperation 
to the breaker itself.  This stuck breaker probability, Pc, can be calculated simply as the 
proportion of failed operations upon request relative to the total number of operation 
requests. 
2.4.2 Circuit Breaker Operational Failure Modeling 
  
Circuit breakers are required to perform switching actions under fault currents.  
These switching actions place enormous stress on the breaker components; as such the 
circuit breaker, and in particular the feeder circuit breakers, will be studied in more detail.  
The analysis will proceed as follows: (1) a recurrence analysis of operational failures 
using non-parametric Mean Cumulative Functions (MCFs) will be performed by breaker 
age; (2) breakers will then be compared by interrupting medium; (3) a parametric model 
will be fitted by interrupting medium using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE); and 
finally (4) a prediction of the future number of operational failures will be calculated.  
This section will provide a background on the methods used and a review of the available 
technical literature as it applies to circuit breakers.  Results of the analyses performed are 
provided in Section 3.2.2 
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Heising (1983) presents a summary of failure data presented by industry group 
and notes some of the issues with reporting breaker failures.  Lindquist, Bertling & 
Erickson (2008) provide average failure rates and fitted Weibull models for high voltage 
SF6 (sodium hexafluoride) breaker parts by cumulative number of operations.  
Bumblauskas et al. (2012) provides a recurrence analysis of breaker warranty claims for 
SF6 breakers of varying ages up to twelve years.  One of the common themes in all of 
these references is the difficulty in defining failure, using breaker age or cumulative 
number of operations in the failure calculation, and the limitations in the data available. 
 
An operational failure will be defined here as an instance where a breaker fails to 
open or close resulting in corrective action.  Breaker age is used in lieu of the arguably 
better measure of cumulative number of operations as this information is not available. 
 
A repairable system is one in which the system can be restored to operating 
condition in the event of a failure (Trindade 2006).  This does not necessarily mean that 
the system is “as good as new” as the entire system isn’t being replaced; just that it is 
capable of being placed back in service through some sort of repair.  Repairable systems 
can be comprised of many repairable or non-repairable components.  Non-repairable 
components are those that either cannot be repaired or that don’t make economic sense to 
repair.  An automobile is a good example of a repairable system in that it is comprised of 
many components that are either are repaired (batteries recharged) or replaced (tires) and 
the car then returned to service. 
 
When evaluating a single repairable system, a cumulative plot of the event history 
(failures, costs, etc.) for that particular system can be plotted versus time or some other 
more suitable unit such as miles, operations, etc.  For non-parametric modeling this is 
represented by a step function as an example shows in Figure 2.15.  Much information is 






The linear plot shown in Figure 2.15 implies that the rate of occurrence of failure 
(ROCOF), or recurrence rate, is constant with time.  This effectively implies that the 
times between failures, or inter-arrival times, are constant versus time and that the system 
is neither improving nor deteriorating.  Figure 2.16 clearly shows that a system that is 
deteriorating with time as the slope of the curve increases with time, implying that the 
time between failures decreases with time.  Finally, Figure 2.17 shows a system that is 
improving with time as the slope of the curve decreases with time, implying that the 
inter-arrival times are increasing with time. 
 
 
Figure 2.16 Increasing ROCOF 
 
 
Figure 2.17 Decreasing ROCOF 
 
 
An important distinction should be made between the recurrence rate of repairable 
systems and the failure rate of non-repairable systems.  In non-repairable systems, the 




failure times of individual units are assumed to be independent and identically distributed 
– that is, the time to failure of the first unit is distributed identically to the second unit and 
so forth.  In repairable systems, this is not necessarily the case as sequential failure times 
may not be identically distributed – i.e. the sequence of failure matters.  
 
This unit cumulative plot idea can be extended to multiple systems (or a fleet of 
systems) by developing a Mean Cumulative Function (MCF).  The MCF represents the 
average cumulative performance of all of the systems versus time and is used in lieu of 
plotting individual cumulative plots for each unit in a fleet of systems.  Figure 2.18 below 
depicts a sample MCF plot: 




Each of the black lines in Figure 2.18 represents a unit system cumulative plot 
with the red line representing the MCF for the fleet of all units.  This MCF represents the 
pointwise average of all the individual system cumulative plots with time.  In this 
particular instance, the MCF represents the average cumulative number of failures for all 
of the units in this system versus time.  Alternately, the MCF could represent some other 
value, such as the mean cumulative repair cost with age; the MCF could also be plotted 
against some other unit value, such as miles driven, number of operations, etc.   
 
Figure 2.18 Sample Mean Cumulative Function (MCF) 
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The non-parametric MCF is constructed by increasing incrementally at each 
failure by taking into account only the units that were in service at that particular time.  
This method allows for difficult censored and/or truncated data sets, as is the case with 
staggered entry and limited data availability.  Right censoring refers to the instance where 
event information is not available after a certain unit time – i.e. a circuit breaker that was 
placed in service and operated for 15 years (and with event information available during 
the entire 15 years) will not be included in the MCF plot at year 20, simply because the 
information on the performance of that unit after 15 years is unavailable.  This is the case 
where units were introduced gradually into the field, also known as staggered entry.  
Similarly, left censoring refers to the instance where the event history of a unit is 
unavailable prior to a certain age.  This typically occurs when data collection begins 
subsequent to a unit being placed in service.  Combinations of left and right censoring 
can also be addressed in the MCF calculation by appropriately adjusting the number of 
units in service versus system age.   
 
As an example, a simple MCF is provided here for a fleet of three individual 
systems (circuit breakers) with only right-censoring.  An event plot is show in Figure 
2.19 below with the associated MCF shown in Figure 2.20.  In the event plot, the dots 
denote failure times and the red line termination denotes a right-censoring time.  The 
failures here denote operational failures; the MCF is plotted versus breaker age (in years).  












In this simple example, the average number of cumulative operational failures for 
this fleet of breakers by age 40 is 1.667, and the system is slightly improving with age 
(intuitively this is unlikely and is strictly a function of the example data). 
 
It is of interest to determine if there is a statistically significant difference in the 
performance of a particular group relative to others.  The methods given in Nelson [2003] 
and Meeker [1998] allow for pairwise comparisons of the individual mean cumulative 














so a 95% confidence interval for the difference in the grouped MCFs is as follows: 
])(,)([)](),([ 975.0975.0   seztsezttt  
Event Age (Years) 0 2 5 8 10 20 35 40
Event Description Start 84301 Failure 3601 Failure 84301 Right Censored 1201 Failure 1201 Failure 3601 Right Censored 1201 Right Censored
Units at Risk 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 0
Failures per unit at Risk 0.000 0.333 0.333 0.500 0.500
MCF 0.000 0.333 0.667 0.667 1.167 1.667 1.667 1.667
Figure 2.19 Example Event Plot 
Table 2.3 Example MCF Calculation 
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These are pointwise confidence limits and only apply to a single instance in time 
versus a simultaneous interval which would apply to the interval MCF difference.  If the 
limits of the interval do not enclose zero for a significant portion under study then there is 
a statistically significant difference between the two groups under observation. 
 
It is also of interest to have an idea of the expected number of future operational 
failures.  To do so, a parametric model must be fitted to the data; previous sections have 
dealt with non-parametric estimates of the MCF.  Generally, if a MCF has a constant 
recurrence rate then it can be modeled with a Homogeneous Poisson Process (HPP), 
where the recurrence rate is λ and the expected number of recurrences over time Δt is 
λΔt.   
 
If, however, the recurrence rate is not constant, a Non-Homogeneous Poisson 
Process (NHPP) can be fitted to the data.  There are a couple of different NHPP model 
options available, but for this analysis the NHPP Power Process is used, where: 
ttM )(  
where the beta and alpha parameters are fitted to the data using Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation (MLE).  If beta is less than one, the recurrence rate decreases with time 
signifying a system that improves with time; for beta = 1 the recurrence rate is constant 
and the model reduces to the HPP (the HPP is therefore shown to be a special case of the 
NHPP); if beta is greater than one then the recurrence rate increases with time and the 
system is deteriorating.  The recurrence rate can be calculated as: 




The Maximum Likelihood estimates for the NHPP Power model are given in Crow 
























































K = # of systems under study 
q = current system, q = 1, 2,..., K 
Sq = observation start time for system q 
Tq = observation termination time for system q 
Nq = # of failures experienced by the q-th system 
Xiq = age of system q at the ith occurrence of failure, i = 1, 2,…, Nq 
 













dttdttttN   
We are interested in the expected number of future failures given the current age 
of the individual units in service.  As an example, let’s assume that we have fitted the 
NHPP Power Process Model via MLE with fitted parameters alpha = 0.0029 and beta = 
1.2575 (beta > 1, implying an increasing recurrence rate).  Let’s also say that we are 
interested in breakers that are 47 years old and assume that there are currently 25 units of 
this age in service.  The total cumulative expected number of future failures in the next 





















So the contribution to the total cumulative number of future failures is 1.25 
failures.  The total cumulative expected number of future failures would then be the sum 
of the individual contributions from each breaker interval.   
2.4.3 Substation Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
 
It is now possible to apply the active and passive failure modeling to the 
substation FMEA.  Billinton & Allan (1996) provide an algorithm for the evaluation of 
the failure modes at each load point as follows 
1. Evaluate minimum cut sets simulating total failure events 
2. Evaluate minimum cut sets simulating active failure events and stuck breakers as 
follows: 
a. Select a component to simulate the active failure. 
b. Determine if the active failure of the selected component and/or its protective 
breakers appears between the load point being studied and a source.  If not, 
ignore. 
c. If these components break all source paths, this active failure is a first-order 
failure event. 
d. If these components break only some of the source paths, evaluate the 
minimum cuts sets of the remaining source paths.  These represent second-
order or higher failure events. 
e. Determine if cut sets are already contained in a lower order failure event; if so 
discard. 
f. Repeat for all remaining components. 
 
Using the algorithm above for the sample substation shown in Figure 2.11, the failure 
events at load point A are therefore: 
Total Failure Events: {1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5},{8} 
First-Order Active Events: {6A}, {7A} 




The failure rate and repair times for these first and second order events is calculated as 
follows: 









where s1 is the switching time  of component 1. 























 )( 1  
where sb is the time to switch the breaker. 
 
As an example, the reliability of the substation in Figure 2.11 can now be evaluated using 
the assumed component values given in Table 2.4: 
 
Table 2.4 Component Data for Substation in Figure 2.11 
Component λ (f/yr) λ
a
 (f/yr) r (hrs) s (hrs) Pc 
T-Line 1 0.09 0.09 9 - - 
H.V. Breaker 2 0.02 0.01 5 - 0.05 
Xfmr 2 0.05 0.05 24 - - 
Bus 4 0.01 0.01 3 - - 
L.V. Breaker 5, 6,7 0.02 0.01 5 2 0.05 
Feeder 8, 9, 10 0.01 0.01 2 2 - 
 
 
Using the values in Table 2.4, the reliability indices for load point A can be calculated as 




Table 2.5 System Reliability of Load Point A in Figure 2.11 
Min Cut Set λ (f/yr) r (hrs) U (hrs/yr) 
1 0.09 9 0.81 
2 0.02 5 0.10 
3 0.05 24 1.20 
4 0.01 3 0.03 
5 0.02 5 0.10 
8 0.01 2 0.02 
6A 0.01 2 0.02 
7A 0.01 2 0.02 
9A+6S 0.0005 2 0.001 
10A+7S 0.0005 2 0.001 
Total 0.221 10.413 2.302 
 
2.5 Distribution System Assessment 
  
Consider the feeder shown in Feeder 2.21, which represents Feeder #1 to be used 
in forthcoming sections.  There are seven (7) load points representing various customer 
types (residential/commercial/industrial) with the number of customers shown.  
Residential customers are fed from 1-Ø lines; commercial and industrial customers are 
fed from 3-Ø lines.  These load points are located behind fused taps off of the main 
backbone feeder in order to isolate faults.  The feeder exits the substation underground 
(denoted by the dotted lines), typically in a concrete-encased ductline.  The underground 
cables rise up on wooden poles and form the main backbone.  There are three (3) 
normally closed sectionalizing switches (S1, S2, S3) that are used to isolate faulted feeder 
sections.  A normally open tie switch (S4) allows for load transfers to the adjacent feeder.  
As an example, assume that a fault has occurred on Section 4 in Figure 2.21.  The 
feeder breaker at the substation opens and all customers on that feeder experience an 
outage.  A troubleshooter is dispatched to locate the fault.  After finding the fault, the 
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troubleshooter will open switch S1 and S2, SCADA will close the feeder breaker back 
thereby restoring power to customers at load points 1 & 2.  The troubleshooter then 
closes the normally open tie switch and power is restored to the customers at load points 
5, 6 & 7.  A repair crew is called out to repair the faulted portion of section 4, meaning 
that all of the customers at load points 3 & 4 will experience an outage equal to the repair 
duration and the time required to reconfigure the system back to its original state.  
The addition of fuses on lateral taps changes the sections of the feeder that 
contribute to failures at each respective load point. If the load point of interest is load 
point #2 in Figure 2.21, a fault somewhere along section #2 will cause the fuses to isolate 
that fault, assuming the fuse operates properly.  If the fuse does not operate properly, the 
failure rate contribution of the faulted section can be calculated as follows (Billinton & 
Allan, 1996): 
Failure Rate = (Failure Rate|Fuse Operates)*P(Fuse Operates) +  
             (Failure Rate|Fuse Fails)*P(Fuse Fails) 
The addition of sectionalizing and tie switches along the feeder can reduce the 
outage duration experienced.  It should be noted, however, that the addition of these 
switches does not reduce the frequency of interruptions as any fault along the backbone 
will cause the breaker to trip.  If there are no capacity concerns associated with 
transferring load then the outage duration of the load points on the switchable sections is 
simply the time associated with the switching operation.  If there are capacity concerns, 
and the probability of transfer is known, the expected outage duration of the appropriate 
switchable section can be calculated as follows (Billinton & Allan, 1996) 
Outage Time = (Outage Time|Fuse Operates)*P(Transfer) +  






Figure 2.21 Feeder #1 
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 As an example of these ideas in application with the series systems equations, the 
reliability indices as calculated for load point #3 in Figure 2.X are as follows: 
   


























































2.6 Decoupled Composite Model Assessment 
  
 Traditionally, the calculation of reliability impacts has been handled separately 
for the transmission, substation, and distribution systems.  Technical literature generally 
focuses on the analysis of a particular subsystem.  Commercially available software is 
able to calculate distribution system reliability values but ignores the substation and 
transmission system impacts.  Brown and Taylor (1999) provide a method for evaluating 
the reliability impacts of the substation and transmission systems on the distribution 
system through the use of decoupled composite modeling.  Essentially, the outputs of the 
various subsystem reliability assessments are used as an equivalent input in the 
distribution system analysis.  The equivalent expected outage frequency, repair time, and 
outage duration for the transmission and substations are then modeled as an equivalent 
block in series with the distribution system components.  The system is then easily 
evaluated using the methods described in previous sections. 
2.7 Reliability Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
The methods described in previous sections allow for the development of a 
predictive reliability model of a power system.  This model can then be used to estimate 
the impacts of various projects aimed at improving the reliability of the system.  Each 
 
 52 
utility will have to decide how to define reliability, whether via SAIFI, SAIDI, customer 
outage costs, etc.  Choudhury & Koval (2009) and Brown (2000) provide valuable 
options for using a benefit-cost approach to reliability-based planning with the former 
using both the reliability indices, customer outage costs, and a cost/kW as bases for 
benefit calculation, whereas the latter introduces the concept of marginal cost-benefit 
planning whereby multiple project options for the same project are introduced and 
benefits are maximized at the expense of cost, minimum BCR, and marginal BCR 
constraints. 
This thesis will use CMI as the benefit when comparing project options, with the 
benefit-cost of a project option simply being the project costs divided by the change in 
CMI relative to some base case.  A group of projects can then be ranked in order of 
decreasing $/CMI spent, where $/CMI is used to compare the efficiency of each 
reliability dollar spent.  These projects can then be plotted without interaction 




CHAPTER 3  
COMPOSITE POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY EVALUATION 
 
The model used in this thesis is a hybrid of actual 161 kV transmission lines 
feeding a 161-23 kV substation from a utility located in the Southeast United States.  The 
substation has been modified slightly at the feeder breaker level so as to work with a four 
feeder distribution test system (Allan et al., 1991).  The distribution system itself has 
been modified to assist in comparing projects across work areas.  
3.1 Transmission Reliability Evaluation  
The existing transmission line route is shown in red in Figures 3.1.  As denoted in 
the figure, there is a section of the existing transmission feed that shares common 
structures.  The loss of a single structure in this common-tower section due to some 
external event, such as a vehicle impact, could result in complete substation outage.  It 
should be noted that there is also the potential for a single external event to outage 
multiple structures sharing a common-Right-Of-Way (ROW).  For example, a wildfire, 
flood, or tornado in the area could likely outage multiple structures sharing a common-
ROW.  The forthcoming analysis will not quantify these potential impacts and it will not 
be addressed further. 
 
The lengths of the transmission circuits feeding the substation and the respective 













Table 3.1 Transmission Circuit Lengths 
Circuit Length (ft) 
Feed #1 21,265 




Failure rates and repair times must be known to use the models.  Oklahoma Gas and 
Electric Company’s experience (Masud 1976), exclusive of lightning, is reproduced here 






Figure 3.1 Existing Transmission Route 
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Table 3.2 Transmission Line Data 




Repair Duration (hours) 
r 
69 0.011 6 
138 0.0065 9 
161 0.0050 9 
345 0.0025 12 
500 0.0020 12 
 
 
Only one source (Landgren et al., 1986) presents specific information on 
common-tower outage rates.  This information, however, is for 345 kV transmission lines 
and for differing design years and exposure.  In most technical references the common-
mode failure rate is assumed to be a proportion of the independent failure rate (i.e. λc/λ).  
In the discussion of Billinton et al. (1981), Commonwealth Edison’s experience is that 
the common-cause failure mode is between 15%-18% of the independent rate.  A range 
of values will be plotted in this analysis, with the detailed comparison presented at a 
value of 20%. 
Applying the model shown in Figure 2.11 with the line lengths in Table 3.1 and 
the outage data in Table 3.2 results in the steady-state probability of being in State 4 

















This plot shows that the steady-state probability of both lines being down is 
exceedingly low.  It should first be pointed out that including a common-cause failure 
mode increases the steady-state probability of State 4 by several orders of magnitude.  
This implies that not including this failure mode would result in more optimistic results.  
It also appears that the increase in the ratio of λc/λ slowly changes the steady-state 
probabilities after about 2.5%. 
At λc/λ = 20%, the steady-state probability of both lines down is 8.37 x 10
-7
.  This 
value can be interpreted as the proportion of time this arrangement is expected to spend 
in this state.  Since the lines are in a parallel arrangement, we can sum the steady-state 
probabilities of States 1, 2 & 3 to find that we expect to find at least one of the lines up 
99.9999163% of the time. 
The expected average annual unavailability (U) of the transmission feed to 
Substation 49 for the expected and proposed cases can therefore be calculated as: 
 
Uexisting = (8.37 x 10
-7







0.0% 2.5% 5.0% 7.5% 10.0% 12.5% 15.0% 17.5% 20.0%
λc/λ 
Probability of Both Transmission Lines Out 
Figure 3.2 State 4 Probabilities for Substation Transmission Feed 
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3.2 Substation Reliability Evaluation 
Substation reliability indices will now be evaluated using the methods presented 
in Section 2.  The substation model will be presented first.  A circuit breaker operational 
failure recurrence analysis will follow with the remaining component modeling coming 
thereafter.  Cut sets in concert with the component data will inform the FMEA 
calculation and associated substation reliability indices. 
3.2.1 Substation Model 
 
The substation one-line diagram is shown in Figure 3.3.  The two (2) 161 kV 
transmission feeds are shown with a normally closed high side breaker (breaker 8).  
These then feed two (2) 161-23 kV power transformers that in turn feed a 23 kV 
operating bus split by a normally open sectionalizing breaker (breaker 7).  The four 
feeders of the distribution system tap off of the operating bus.  The switches shown are 
non-load break switches meant to serve as visible confirmation of open/closed circuits.  
Circuit breaker component modeling will be presented in the next section with the 
remaining component information following thereafter.  This information will then be 





Figure 3.3 Substation One-Line Diagram 
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3.2.2 Circuit Breaker Operational Failure Recurrence Analysis 
 
There are approximately 495 substation feeder circuit breakers currently operating 
at 12 or 23 kV at a utility in the Southeast United States that form the dataset for this 
analysis.  The median breaker age, regardless of interrupting medium, is 36 years.  Oil-
interrupting breakers represent the majority of these (64%; median age 43 years) with the 
remainder roughly evenly distributed between SF6 gas-interrupting breakers (18%; 
median age 21 years) and vacuum-interrupting breakers (18%; median age 11 years).  
Since 1993, there have been approximately 126 operational failures attributed to these 
feeder circuit breakers; an operational failure is defined as an instance where a breaker 
fails to open/close resulting in corrective action.  These operational failures have resulted 
in lengthy customer outages and repair times. 
 
A complete listing of breakers under study and associated details is provided in a 
supplemental file to this thesis (File 2, feeder_summary.xls).  Operational failure 
historical data is available from 1993-present; a breakdown of breaker age and 
interrupting medium is provided in Figure 3.4 & 3.5.  As is shown, there is a considerable 
amount of operational failure information that is not available for study resulting in 
heavily left-censored data – particularly for the oil breakers.  
 
Several important assumptions have been made.  The first is that if the age of the 
breaker is not explicitly provided in the breaker dataset, it is assumed to have been placed 
in service at the date the substation was energized.  The second is that only events 
resulting in outage times greater than 5 minutes are included in the operational failure 
listing.  This is to remove instances of breaker operations due to lightning, clear 
temporary faults, etc., and to focus on events that impact reliability indices.  It also 
excludes any maintenance activity that did not result in an outage to customers.  This 
analysis also only focuses on distribution feeder breakers – high side breakers, capacitor 












It was necessary to shift the data from calendar time to event time, as shown in 
the representative event plots for the breakers given below.  In Figure 3.6, the breaker 
Operational Failure 
Data Range 
Figure 3.4 Feeder Breakers In Service 
Figure 3.5 Feeder Breakers by Age 
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information for the breakers in calendar time; Figure 3.7 shows the data adjusted to a 











Figure 3.6 Breaker Event Plot by Calendar 
Figure 3.7 Shifted Breaker Event Plot 
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There were several instances of operational failures that had to be excluded from 
consideration as these failures occurred prior to the installation of the current breaker in 
the database and no information on the replaced breaker was available.  These values 
would have resulted in negative event times. 
 
Operational failure modes, when provided or ascertained, are summarized in 
Figure 3.8.  As can be seen, the majority of the failure causes are either unknown or were 
not input into the reliability database.  When provided, the dominant failure mode is low 






The low pressure failure mode is exclusive to oil and gas breakers.  In the case of 
the oil breakers, the closing operation is based on a hydraulic actuating mechanism driven 
by a 90-220 psi tank, compressor, and motor assembly.  Generally, this assembly can 
perform three operations without recharging.  The tripping operation is performed 
separately by a spring and operates independently of this hydraulic system.  Gas breakers 
are filled with SF6 gas and are unable to open or close when gas leaks out through O-
rings.  A closer investigation of the failure data reveals that the breakers fail open 
approximately 90% of the time. 
 
Figure 3.8 Failure Modes 
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The methodology described in previous sections was applied to the breaker data 
with the aforementioned assumptions.  Due to the complicated censoring, the interval-age 
approach given in Nelson (2003) was extended to include left-censored data and used in 
the analysis.  It should be noted that, at present, commercially available statistical 
analysis packages (JMP, etc.) do not allow for left censoring in recurrence platforms so 
all of the analysis was performed via Excel spreadsheets.  Initially, all of the breakers are 
considered together and a “system-of-systems” MCF is plotted.  This MCF is informative 
but does not necessarily reveal underlying trends that can potentially motivate action.  As 
such, the data are then sorted by interrupting medium and MCFs are then calculated for 
each and compared.  Due to the limitations of the data (small samples sizes, no failures, 
etc.), it is not feasible to create MCFs by breaker manufacturer. 
 
All of the breakers are initially aggregated to create a pooled MCF for the entire 
feeder breaker fleet.   Figure 3.9 shows this system MCF with associated 95% confidence 
interval bands.  The censored units are assumed to have either entered or exited halfway 
through the interval on average (done by multiplying units at risk by 0.5).  This step 
extends the methodology given in Nelson (2003) to account for the left-censored 
observations.  A supplemental file to this thesis (File 3, system_mcf.xls) displays the 





Figure 3.9 Pooled MCF 
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It is apparent from the system MCF that the system is deteriorating with time as 
the MCF slope is increasing.  Intuitively this makes sense due to aging components.  The 
breaker data were then sorted by interrupting medium and grouped MCFs plotted with 




Figure 3.10 Non-Parametric Oil MCF 
 
Figure 3.11 Non-Parametric Gas MCF 
 
Figure 3.12 Non-Parametric Vacuum MCF 
 
 
The oil breaker MCF shown Figure 3.10 has the largest range of data; the 
confidence interval half-width is large due to the small number of early age units at risk 
and the fact that the variance is additive with time.  The left-censoring from the 
operational failure data unavailability is ultimately a non-issue as the performance of the 
oil breakers early in life is non-informative – i.e., a breaker that fails catastrophically and 
is replaced will not be replaced with an oil breaker.  A supplemental file to this thesis 
(File 4, oil_mcf.xls) displays the calculation details. 
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The gas breaker MCF shown in Figure 3.11 clearly shows a deteriorating system 
as the recurrence rate is increasing with system age.  For convenience of comparison the 
MCF is plotted through 70 years though it is non-informative after ~30 years due to the 
range of the data.  Obviously, the gas breakers are a cause for concern. A supplemental 
file to this thesis (File 5, gas_mcf.xls) displays the calculation details. 
 
The vacuum breaker MCF is plotted in Figure 3.12 and shows a recurrence rate 
that is roughly constant with time.  Again, the MCF is plotted through 70 years for 
convenience but should be ignored after ~38 years due to the data range.  Clearly the 
performance of the vacuum breakers is superior to that of the oil and gas breakers.  A 
supplemental file to this thesis (File 6, vacuum_mcf.xls) displays the calculation details. 
 





As can be seen above, the pointwise confidence limits do not envelop zero for the 
range of the data after roughly 20 years so there is a statistically significant difference 
between the gas and vacuum breakers at the level of significance chosen.  Due to the 
heavy left-censoring of the oil breakers relative to the range of the data for the gas and 
vacuum breakers, it is not feasible to compare the oil breakers. 
 
Figure 3.13 Gas vs. Vacuum Breakers 
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The results of the parameter estimation for each of the breaker types using the 
MLE methods in section 2.4.2 are given in Table 3.3.  Based upon the visual trend tests 
and the fitted beta values, it is assumed that the vacuum breakers follow the HPP process 
and the gas breakers follow the NHPP model.  Given the uncertainty due to small sample 
sizes for oil breakers less than age ~20, a formal determination of HPP/NHPP will not be 
made 
 
Table 3.3 MLE Fitted NHPP Model Parameters 
Breaker Type  ̂  ̂ 
Oil Interrupting 0.003659 1.3319 
Gas Interrupting 0.000136 2.3877 
Vacuum Interrupting 0.0063 1.0 
 
 
Figures 3.14 thru 3.15 show the non-parametric estimates as well as the fitted 




Figure 3.14 Fitted Oil MCF 
 
 








Using these models in conjunction with the method presented in Section 2.4.2, the 
total expected number of operational failures in the next five years conditioned upon the 
current in service age of the individual breakers is 43.  Oil breakers will contribute 
approximately 28 to the total; gas breakers are estimated to contribute approximately 12 
to the total with vacuum breakers contributing the remaining 3 estimated failures.  The 
gas breakers are disproportionally contributing to the total considering the gas breakers 
represent only 18% of the entire breaker fleet.  Supplemental Files 4-6 provide the failure 
prediction calculation details. 
 
 
Figure 3.16 Fitted Vacuum MCF 
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3.2.3 Substation Component Modeling 
 
 A summary of the component reliability data used in the analysis is provided in 
Table 3.4.   
Table 3.4 Substation Component Modeling 
Component λ (f/yr) λ
a
 (f/yr) λc (f/yr) r (hrs) s (hrs) Pc 
T-Line Feed 1 0.0201 0.0201 0.0016347 9 3.5 - 
T-Line Feed 2 0.03647 0.03647 0.0016347 9 3.5 - 
Xfmr 1, 2 0.03 0.03 - 70 3.5 - 
H.V. Breaker 8 0.017 0.0017 - 32 3.5 0.05 
L.V. Breaker 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7 
0.017 0.0017 - 32 3.5 0.05 
Feeder 1 0.1678 0.1678 -    
Feeder 2 0.1061 0.1061 -    
Feeder 3 0.1813 0.1813 -    
Feeder 4 0.1791 0.1791 -    
 
The transmission line data uses line length data from Table 3.1 and component 
data information from Table 3.2. The transformer values are assumed.  The total feeder 
breaker failure rate assumes that the median aged oil interrupting breaker is used. The 
active failure rate is taken as a tenth of the total failure rate as it was noted that 90% of 
the time the failure type is passive.  Breaker repair time is taken from Chowdhury & 
Koval (2009) which is the sum of callout, isolation and repair/replace times.  The high 
side breaker is assumed to behave similar to the feeder circuit breaker.  Substation 
switching times are assumed.  It is assumed that the busbars and disconnect switches are 
perfectly reliable.   
Feeder failure rates are calculated as the sum of the products of the individual line 
lengths and respective component failure rates.  The details of both the lengths and 
failure data are provide in Section 3.3. 
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3.2.4 Substation Reliability Evaluation 
 
 As was discussed in Section 2.5 the transmission and substation systems will 
decompose into an equivalent block in series.  To do this, an equivalent source per feeder 
is modeled whereby all of the transmission and substation system surrounding the 
respective feeder breaker are reduced to an equivalent block with an expected failure rate 
and annual outage duration.  This block will then be placed in series with its feeder in the 
next section and reliability indices calculated for each load point.  Using the above ideas, 
the component data in Table 3.4, and the respective minimum cut sets results in the 
following equivalent source per feeder as shown in Tables 3.5 thru 3.8 
 
Table 3.5 Feeder #1 Equivalent Source 
Event λ (f/yr) r (hrs) U (hrs/yr) 
T. Line Feed 1 + T. Line Feed 2 0.001636206 4.5 0.0073629 
T. Line Feed 1 + H.V. Breaker 8 1.59928E-06 7.0243902 1.123E-05 
Xfmr 1 0.03 3.5 0.105 
L.V. Breaker 5 0.017 3.5 0.0595 
T. Line Feed 1A 0.0201 3.5 0.07035 
H.V. Breaker 8A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
T. Line Feed 2A + H.V. Breaker 8S 0.0018235 3.5 0.0063823 
Xfmr 2A + T. Line Feed 1 8.60445E-07 2.52 2.168E-06 
T. Line Feed 2A + H.V. Breaker 8S 0.0015 3.5 0.00525 
L.V. Breaker 6A + T. Line Feed 1 4.87586E-08 2.52 1.229E-07 
Sectionalizing Breaker 7A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
FB2A + L.V. Breaker 6S + T. Line Feed 1 2.43793E-09 3.5 8.533E-09 
FB3A + L.V. Breaker 6S + T. Line Feed 1 2.43793E-09 3.5 8.533E-09 
FB4A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
Feeder 4 + FB4S 0.0089525 3.5 0.0313338 




Table 3.6 Feeder #2 Equivalent Source 
Event λ (f/yr) r (hrs) U (hrs/yr) 
T. Line Feed 1 + T. Line Feed 2 0.001636206 4.5 0.0073629 
T. Line Feed 1 + H.V. Breaker 8 1.59928E-06 7.0243902 1.123E-05 
Xfmr 1 0.03 3.5 0.105 
L.V. Breaker 5 0.017 3.5 0.0595 
T. Line Feed 1A 0.0201 3.5 0.07035 
H.V. Breaker 8A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
T. Line Feed 2A + H.V. Breaker 8S 0.0018235 3.5 0.0063823 
Xfmr 2A + T. Line Feed 1 8.60445E-07 2.52 2.168E-06 
Xfmr 2A + H.V. Breaker 8S 0.0015 3.5 0.00525 
L.V. Breaker 6A + T. Line Feed 1 4.87586E-08 2.52 1.229E-07 
Sectionalizing Breaker 7A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
FB2A + L.V. Breaker 6S + T. Line Feed 1 2.43793E-09 3.5 8.533E-09 
FB3A + L.V. Breaker 6S + T. Line Feed 1 2.43793E-09 3.5 8.533E-09 
FB1A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
Feeder 1 + FB1S 0.00839 3.5 0.029365 

















Table 3.7 Feeder #3 Equivalent Source 
Event λ (f/yr) r (hrs) U (hrs/yr) 
T. Line Feed 2 + T. Line Feed 1 0.001636206 4.5 0.0073629 
T. Line Feed 2 + H.V. Breaker 8 2.90178E-06 7.0243902 2.038E-05 
Xfmr 2 0.03 3.5 0.105 
L.V. Breaker 6 0.017 3.5 0.0595 
T. Line Feed 2A 0.03647 3.5 0.127645 
H.V. Breaker 8A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
T. Line Feed 1A + H.V. Breaker 8S 0.001005 3.5 0.0035175 
Xfmr 1A + T. Line Feed 2 1.56122E-06 2.52 3.934E-06 
Xfmr 1A + H.V. Breaker 8S 0.0015 3.5 0.00525 
L.V. Breaker 5A + T. Line Feed 2 8.84689E-08 2.52 2.229E-07 
Sectionalizing Breaker 7A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
FB1A + L.V. Breaker 5S + T. Line Feed 2 4.42344E-09 3.5 1.548E-08 
FB4A + L.V. Breaker 5S + T. Line Feed 2 4.42344E-09 3.5 1.548E-08 
FB3A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
Feeder 3 + FB3S 0.0090625 3.5 0.0317188 













Table 3.8 Feeder #4 Equivalent Source 
Event λ (f/yr) r (hrs) U (hrs/yr) 
T. Line Feed 2 + T. Line Feed 1 0.001636206 4.5 0.0073629 
T. Line Feed 2 + H.V. Breaker 8 2.90178E-06 7.0243902 2.038E-05 
Xfmr 2 0.03 3.5 0.105 
L.V. Breaker 6 0.017 3.5 0.0595 
T. Line Feed 2A 0.03647 3.5 0.127645 
H.V. Breaker 8A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
T. Line Feed 1A + H.V. Breaker 8S 0.001005 3.5 0.0035175 
Xfmr 1A + T. Line Feed 2 1.56122E-06 2.52 3.934E-06 
Xfmr 1A + H.V. Breaker 8S 0.0015 3.5 0.00525 
L.V. Breaker 5A + T. Line Feed 2 8.84689E-08 2.52 2.229E-07 
Sectionalizing Breaker 7A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
FB1A + L.V. Breaker 5S + T. Line Feed 2 4.42344E-09 3.5 1.548E-08 
FB4A + L.V. Breaker 5S + T. Line Feed 2 4.42344E-09 3.5 1.548E-08 
FB2A 0.0017 3.5 0.00595 
Feeder 2 + FB2S 0.005305 3.5 0.0185675 
Total (Feeder 4) 0.098020767 3.5167803 0.3447175 
 
These results show that the expected unavailability at the source side of the 
respective feeder breaker is around 0.30 to 0.35 hours per year (roughly 18-21 minutes) 
as a result of the substation and transmission system failures.  The distribution system 
contribution to this total will be calculated in the next section. 
3.2.5 Distribution Reliability Assessment 
 
The distribution system, as modified from Allan et al. (1991), is shown in Figure 
3.18.  The 3-Ø feeders getaway from the substation underground as denoted by the dotted 
lines and then rise up overhead.  Fused taps lateral off of the backbone feeder with 
lengths shown in Table 3.9 feeding customers at load points as described in Table 3.10.  
Normally closed (NC) sectionalizing switches allow for feeder section isolation.  
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Normally open (NO) tie switches allow for load transfer between adjacent feeders.  It is 
assumed that the probability of successful switching is unity for the first sectionalizing 
switch behind the open point then decrementing by 10% for each successive switch 
behind the tie switch as shown.  Component failure rate and switching times, based on 
published literature, are assembled by Chowdhury & Koval (2009), modified slightly, 
and presented in Table 3.11.  The repair times are the sum of the times to callout, isolate 
and repair. 
 
Table 3.9 Distribution Section Lengths 
Length (mi) Sections 
0.375 2, 6, 10, 12, 17, 21, 25, 28, 30, 34 
0.46 4, 7, 9, 12G, 16G, 19, 22, 24, 27, 29, 32, 35 
0.5 1G, 3, 5, 8, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 23, 26, 26G, 31, 33, 36, 37 
 
 
Table 3.10 Load Point Customer Information 
Load Points # of Customers Customer Type 
1, 2, 3, 10, 11 210 Residential 
12, 17, 18, 19 200 Residential 
6, 7, 15, 16, 22 10 Small C&I 










Table 3.11 Distribution Component Data 
Component λ (f/yr or f/mi-yr) r (hrs) s (hrs) 
3-Ph OH 0.09 4 1.5 
1-Ph OH 0.03 3 1.5 
Xfmr 3-Ph 0.03 6.5 1 
Xfmr 1-Ph 0.01 3.5 1 
3-Ph UG (XLPE) 0.035 24 3.5 
1-Ph UG (XLPE) 0.02 11 3.5 
Switch (Manual) 0.001 5.5 2 
Fuse 0.003 2 1.5 
 
The calculations will be performed using the information in the Tables above as 






Figure 3.18 Distribution System 
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3.3 Composite Reliability Evaluation 
 
The equivalent feeder source as calculated in 3.2.4 is placed in series with the 
respective feeder as described in Section 3.2.5.  Series system calculations can then be 
performed as in Section 2.5.  For each load point the expected failure rate, outage 
duration, and annual outage duration is calculated as shown in Table 3.12. 
 
Table 3.12 Load Point Reliability Results 
Feeder Load Point λ (f/yr) r (hrs) U (hrs/yr) 
1 1 0.2986 3.9122 1.1684 
1 2 0.3024 3.9009 1.1796 
1 3 0.2974 2.8876 0.8588 
1 4 0.3411 3.1744 1.0827 
1 5 0.3523 2.9582 1.0421 
1 6 0.3487 3.0578 1.0663 
1 7 0.3224 2.8949 0.9333 
2 8 0.2877 4.5657 1.3136 
2 9 0.2603 4.8986 1.2750 
3 10 0.3277 3.7203 1.2192 
3 11 0.3257 2.9261 0.9529 
3 12 0.3315 2.7054 0.8967 
3 13 0.3778 2.9359 1.1091 
3 14 0.3814 2.9460 1.1235 
3 15 0.3701 3.0234 1.1191 
4 16 0.3720 4.0983 1.5244 
4 17 0.3219 3.8295 1.2327 
4 18 0.3219 2.7079 0.8717 
4 19 0.3207 2.9562 0.9479 
4 20 0.3756 3.0061 1.1290 
4 21 0.3720 3.0184 1.1227 
4 22 0.3756 3.0278 1.1371 
 
 
Table 3.12 shows that after adding the distribution system, the load point 
unavailability values increase to about 0.9 to 1.3 hrs/yr.  Recall that the equivalent source 
unavailability values ranged from 0.3 to 0.35 hrs/yr.  This implies that the distribution 
system accounts for roughly 70% of the total load point unavailability with the 
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transmission and substation representing the remaining 30% for this system.  This result 
is fairly consistent with the 20% estimate of Billinton & Jonnavitihula (1996) as the 
substation contribution to load point unavailability.  It also implies that assuming a 
perfectly reliable substation and transmission source when focusing on distribution 
system analysis, as is frequently done, can lead to overly optimistic results.  The load 
point results given in Table 3.12 combined with the customer data given in Table 3.10 
allow for the calculation of the reliability indices as shown in Table 3.13.  
 







F1 54078.089 1.036 $31,118  
F2 155.317 1.294 $2,158  
F3 38934.494 1.027 $13,893  
F4 38360.215 1.028 $27,007  
System 131528.114 1.031 $74,177  
 
  
 CMI is the sum of all annual customer outage minutes of interruption expected.  
Feeder #1 has the highest CMI as it has the most customers; conversely Feeder #2 has the 
lowest CMI as it has the fewest customers.  Similarly, the expected SAIDI value is 
calculated at the feeder and system level reflecting what an average customer can expect 
in terms of annual outage duration.  The ECOST value is the expected annual total 
customer outage costs.  This value takes into account the customer type 
(residential/commercial) and the associated CDF as described in Section 2.1.2 along with 
the expected load point unavailabilities.  It is assumed that all of the commercial 
customers are small C&I and all outages take place on a summer weekday.  The ECOST 
value is strictly the expected customer outage costs; it does not include the repair costs or 




CHAPTER 4  
BUDGET-CONSTRAINED POWER SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
OPTIMIZATION 
 
 The modeling concepts introduced in previous sections allow for the comparison 
of the effects of various project options.  This section will introduce multiple projects in 
the form of case studies.  The projects are chosen from different portions of the power 
system (transmission, substation, distribution) to compare the impacts of potential 
projects from seemingly disparate work areas.   
4.1 Case Studies and Evaluation 
4.1.1 Base Case 
 
The base case consists of the system and components introduced in the previous 
section.  The reliability results of the base case were shown in Table 3.13.  This case 
assumes that all switching is performed manually. 
4.1.2 Case 1: Install Automated Switches by Feeder 
 
One of the technologies that generally fall under the smart grid umbrella is 
distribution automation.  Distribution automation can mean different things, ranging from 
a SCADA operator being able to remotely operate distribution switches to a self-healing 
system whereby the devices constantly poll each other and operate relatively 
autonomously.  In this case, it is assumed that the switches are able to be remotely 
operated by a SCADA operator in 5 minutes as shown in Table 4.1.  In the event of a 
fault, the operator will remotely be able to poll the devices to determine where the fault 
generally is located and isolate.  A crew or troubleshooter is then dispatched to make the 
appropriate repairs.  The failure rate and the repair time are taken as before from 
Chowdhury & Koval (2009); the manual and automated switches are assumed to be 
equivalent in these respects.  The remaining components and assumptions are consistent 
with the base case.   
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Table 4.1 Switching Component Information 
Component λ (f/yr) r (hrs) s (hrs) 
Switch (Manual) 0.001 5.5 2 
Switch (Automated) 0.001 5.5 0.0833 
 
 
The reliability results using the automated switches are presented by feeder in Table 4.2.  
The results assume no interaction between feeders; i.e., even though the automation of a 
tie switch improves the reliability of the adjacent feeder, these improvements will be 
ignored.  
 







F1 36331.068 0.696 $22,797  
F2 132.666 1.106 $1,894  
F3 23763.513 0.627 $10,274  
F4 23623.859 0.633 $21,208  
 
 
These results will be compared with the base case and discussed in Section 4.2.1 along 
with a calculation of the project benefit-costs. 
4.1.3 Case 2: Replace Feeder Breakers by Feeder 
 
Case 2 presents a substation project whereby an existing oil-interrupting breaker 
is replaced by a better performing vacuum-interrupting breaker.  The feeder breaker 
component information is presented in Table 4.3.  As before, it is assumed that the active 
failure rate is a tenth of the total failure rate.  All other component data and assumptions 





Table 4.3 Feeder Breaker Component Information 
Component λ (f/yr) 
Feeder Breaker (Oil) 0.017 
Feeder Breaker (Vacuum) 0.0063 
 
 
The reliability results of replacing the feeder breakers are presented by feeder in 
Table 4.4.  These results will be compared with the base case and discussed in Section 
4.2.2. along with a calculation of the project benefit-costs 
. 
Table 4.4 Case 2 Reliability Results 
Feeder CMI (mins/yr) SAIDI (hrs/yr) ECOST ($/yr) 
F1 52822.337 1.012 $30,355  
F2 151.69 1.264 $2,101  
F3 37732.329 0.995 $13,546  
F4 37282.2 0.999 $26,365  
 
 
4.1.4 Case 3: Replace 3-Ø Underground Getaway Cable by Feeder 
 
The test distribution system as shown in Figure 3.18, as well as in most 
substations, has underground feeder getaway cables from the substation.  Depending 
upon the cable insulation, the performance of the getaway cable an vary widely.  For 
example, early high molecular weight polyehtylene (HMWPE) insulated cables were 
found to be particularly susceptible to water-treeing and early failure (Thue, 1999).  In 
the base case, the getaways are assumed to be cross-linked polyethylene (XLPE) 
insulated with properties listed in Table 4.5, again from Chowdhury & Koval (2009).  As 
a representative cable retrofit example, this case assumes that the existing XLPE-
insulated cables are replaced with tree-retardent cross-linked polyethylene (TRXLPE) 
insulated cables with properties given in Table 4.5.   
Generally, an underground cable fault has a much longer repair time than an 
overhead line.  This is due to the extended time to locate the fault, pull the faulted cable 
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section out of the duct system, install new cable and splice with the existing cables in the 
manhole or terminate appropriately. 
 
Table 4.5 3-Ø Getaway Cable Component Information 
Component λ (f/mi-yr) r (hrs) 
3-Ph UG (XLPE) 0.035 24 
3-Ph UG (TRXLPE) 0.028 24 
 
 
The reliability results of replacing the feeder getaways are presented by feeder in 
Table 4.6.  These results will be compared with the base case and discussed in Section 
4.2.3 along with a calculation of the project benefit-costs. 
 
Table 4.6 Case 3 Reliability Results 
Feeder CMI (mins/yr) SAIDI (hrs/yr) ECOST ($/yr) 
F1 51538.779 0.987 $30,664  
F2 144.768 1.206 $2,029  
F3 37431.878 0.987 $13,759  
F4 36742.492 0.985 $26,248  
 
 
4.1.5 Case 4: Replace 1-Ø Underground Residential Distribution Cable by Feeder 
 
The same issues described in the previous section apply to 1-Ø cables typically 
feeding residential neighborhoods.  Some of these neighborhoods can have cable that is 
direct-buried instead of conduited.  This makes the fault location and repair times 
significantly longer than a conduited system.  These direct-buried cables can also have a 
higher failure rate due to environmental exposure.  This case study will not directly 
address direct-buried cables other than to note the differences in installation.  As a 
representative URD installation, this case study examines the replacement of the 1-Ø 
cables that feed the associated underground taps in the test distribution as shown in 
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Figure 3.18.  It is assumed again that the existing XLPE-insulated cables will be replaced 
with better performing TRXLPE-insulated cables, both with properties shown in Table 
4.7 (Chowdhury & Koval, 2009). 
 
Table 4.7 1-Ø URD Cable Component Information 
Component λ (f/mi-yr) r (hrs) 
1-Ph UG (XLPE) 0.02 11 
1-Ph UG (TRXLPE) 0.013 11 
 
 
The reliability results of replacing the 1-Ø URD cables are presented by feeder in Table 
4.8.  These results will be compared with the base case and discussed in Section 4.2.4 
along with a calculation of the project benefit-costs. 
 
Table 4.8 Case 4 Reliability Results 
Feeder CMI (mins/yr) SAIDI (hrs/yr) ECOST ($/yr) 
F1 53592.157 1.027 $31,104  
F2 155.317 1.294 $2,158  
F3 38487.712 1.015 $13,881  

















4.1.6 Case 5: 161 kV Transmission Improvements 
 
 As was shown in Figure 3.1, both transmission feeds to the substation share a 
common-tower for an extended portion of the route.  This common-tower arrangement 
makes these feeds susceptible to common-cause failures such as vehicle impacts, etc.  In 
Case 5, an alternate route is planned whereby additional structures are added and adjacent 
transmission circuits are reconfigured to reduce the common-tower exposure.  The 
proposed arrangement is shown in Figure 4.1.  As shown in Table 4.9, the common-tower 









Figure 4.1 Proposed Transmission Improvements 
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Table 4.9 Proposed Transmission Circuit Lengths 
Circuit Existing/Proposed Length (ft) 
Feed #1 Existing 21,265 
Feed #2 Existing 37,517 
Common-Tower Existing 8,627 
Feed #1 Proposed 21,265 
Feed #2 Proposed 35,465 
Common-Tower Proposed  750 
 
Applying the model shown in Figure 2.7 with the outage data in Section 3.1 results in the 
steady-state probability of being in State 4 (both circuits down) shown in Figure 4.2 for 




Figure 4.2 State 4 Probabilities for Transmission Lines 
 
 
At λc/λ = 20%, the steady-state probability of both lines down for the existing 
case is 8.3686 x 10
-7
; for the proposed case the steady-state probability of both lines 
down is 7.3552 x 10
-8
 – a 91% reduction.  These values can be interpreted as the 
proportion of time these arrangements are expected to spend in these states.  Since the 
lines are in a parallel arrangement, we can sum the steady-state probabilities of States 1, 2 
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& 3 to find that we expect to find the lines up 99.9999163% of the time for the existing 
case and 99.999993% of the time for the proposed case.  The reliability results of the 
transmission system improvements are presented in Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10 Case 5 Reliability Results 
Feeder CMI (mins/yr) SAIDI (hrs/yr) ECOST ($/yr) 
F1 53796.875 1.031 $30,996  
F2 154.664 1.289 $2,148  
F3 38460.710 1.014 $13,763  
F4 37892.706 1.015 $26,733  




These results will be compared with the base case and discussed in Section 4.2.5 along 
with a calculation of the project benefit-costs. 
 
4.2 Budget-Constrained Project Optimization 
 
4.2.1 Case 1 (Install Automated Switches) Reliability Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
Installing automated switches results in the expected changes as shown in Table 
4.11 for each of the respective feeders.  It is obvious from the results that the greatest 
CMI impact is at Feeder #1, whereas the greatest SAIDI impact is at Feeder #3.  The 
difference is that as Feeder #1 has more customers than Feeder #3 the SAIDI numerator 
is larger for Feeder #1 and the SAIDI denominator is smaller for Feeder #3.  The greatest 
reduction in customer-outage costs is at Feeder #1, again as a result of the large number 
of customers. 
It is interesting to note that this project option does not change the failure rate at 
any of the load points as none of the component failure rates changed.  The only thing 
that changed was the response time.  This is interesting in that it could effectively change 
the operating philosophy from prioritizing retrofits of equipment to improving the 
response and flexibility to failures.  This is important as the distribution systems are 
spatially very large with varying types of equipment placed in service at different times; 
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data available for component modeling at many utilities is sparse to non-existent.  The 
managed response via improved isolation times via automated switching is a very clean 
solution to this type of problem.  The project costs are based upon estimates by the utility 
based upon historical installation costs. 
 
Table 4.11 Case 1 Reliability Improvements & Project Costs 
Feeder ΔCMI ΔSAIDI ΔECOST # Switches Cost/Switch 
F1 17747.020 0.340 $8,321  4 $60,000  
F2 22.650 0.189 $263  2 $60,000  
F3 15170.981 0.400 $3,619  4 $60,000  
F4 14736.355 0.395 $5,800  4 $60,000  
 
 
Table 4.12 presents the reliability benefit-costs of the project at the feeders.  The 
BCACMI value is simply the project costs divided by the change in CMI.  This value can 
be thought of as the dollars spent per customer-minute of interruption avoided.  These are 
then ranked relative to each other by feeder.  This is done similarly for SAIDI and the 
customer outage costs.  These comparisons are done to see how the differing comparison 
methodologies will ultimately rank projects.  It should be noted that the BCA for the 
customer outage costs, even though measured in dollars, doesn’t imply that a value of 1 
means the benefit dollars equal the project costs; the unity value simply means that it is 
the best project and others are compared to it in decreasing value. 
 













F1 $13.52  1.000 $705,921  1.177 0.035 1.000 
F2 $5,297.90  391.758 $635,748  1.060 0.002 0.063 
F3 $15.82  1.170 $599,882  1.000 0.015 0.435 




4.2.2 Case 2 (Feeder Breaker Replacement) Reliability Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
Replacing oil breakers with better performing vacuum breakers results in the 
following changes as shown in Figure 4.13.  Here again the Feeder #1 CMI results are 
better than Feeder #3 whereas the Feeder #3 SAIDI results are better than Feeder #1 
strictly as a result of the difference in customers between feeders reflected in the SAIDI 
calculation.  The project costs are estimated by the utility Substation Engineering 
department based upon historical replacement costs. 
 
Table 4.13 Case 2 Reliability Improvements & Project Costs 
Feeder ΔCMI ΔSAIDI ΔECOST Cost/Breaker 
F1 1255.752 0.024 $763  $125,000  
F2 3.627 0.030 $57  $125,000  
F3 1202.165 0.032 $347  $125,000  
F4 1078.015 0.029 $642  $125,000  
 
 
The BCA values and relative rankings are presented in Table 4.14.  It is already 
obvious that the BCACMI as measured by $/CMI spent is much higher for this project than 
for automating switches; more on this in Section 4.2.6.  The low number of customers on 
Feeder #2 makes this an unattractive option as shown by the high BCACMI value. 
 













F1 $100  1.000 $5,212,958  1.324 6.108E-03  1.000 
F2 $34,464  346.231 $4,124,367  1.048 4.524E-04  0.074 
F3 $104  1.045 $3,936,571  1.000 2.779E-03  0.455 







4.2.3 Case 3 (3-Ø Getaway Cable Replacement) Reliability Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
The reliability results for replacing the XLPE-insulated 3-Ø underground feeder 
getaway cables with TRXLPE-insulated cables are shown in Table 4.15.  The project 
costs assume that the material costs are $100/circuit foot and that material costs represent 
80% of the total project costs.  Cable material costs depend on metals pricing; this value 
is reasonable given utility historical experience.  The total cost per circuit foot installed is 
therefore $125/foot. 
 
Table 4.15 Case 3 Reliability Improvements & Project Costs 
Feeder ΔCMI ΔSAIDI ΔECOST Project Cost 
F1 2539.310 0.049 $454  $330,000  
F2 10.549 0.088 $128  $303,600  
F3 1502.616 0.040 $134  $303,600  
F4 1617.723 0.043 $759  $330,000  
 
 
The BCA values and relative ranking are provided in Table 4.16.  Here Feeder #1 
is the most attractive replacement option based on CMI, whereas feeder #4 would take 
priority based upon minimizing customer-outage costs.  Feeder #2 is an unattractive 
option for either case due to the small number of customers. 
 













F1 $130  1.000 $6,783,734  1.964 1.377E-03 0.599 
F2 $28,780  221.462 $3,453,655  1.000 4.219E-04 0.183 
F3 $202  1.555 $7,661,647  2.218 4.430E-04 0.193 






4.2.4 Case 4 (1-Ø URD Cable Replacement) Reliability Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
The reliability results for replacing the XLPE-insulated 1-Ø URD cables with 
TRXLPE-insulated cables are shown in Table 4.17.  The project costs assume that the 
material costs are a third of the 3-Ø installed costs, or $41.67/ft.  This is reasonable based 
upon the historical experience for the utility.  There are no customers on Feeder #2 fed 
from a 1-Ø source. 
 
Table 4.17 Case 4 Reliability Improvements & Project Costs 
Feeder ΔCMI ΔSAIDI ΔECOST Project Cost 
F1 485.932 0.009 $14  $110,000  
F3 446.781 0.012 $13  $101,200  
F4 462.532 0.012 $14  $110,000  
 
 
The BCA values and relative ranking are provided in Table 4.18.  Here Feeder #1 
& Feeder #3 are essentially a toss-up as to which would be prioritized based upon CMI.   













F1 $226  1.000 $11,816,478  3.421 1.302E-04 1.000 
F3 $227  1.001 $8,589,225  2.487 1.267E-04 0.973 
F4 $238  1.051 $8,875,499  2.570 1.228E-04 0.943 
 
 
4.2.5 Case 5 Reliability Benefit-Cost Analysis 
 
The reliability results for the proposed 161 kV transmission improvements to 
reduce the common-cause failure mode exposure are provided in Table 4.19 for the entire 
system.  The project cost estimate of $6,000,000 was prepared by the Substation & 




Table 4.19 Case 5 Reliability Improvements 
Feeder ΔCMI ΔSAIDI ΔECOST Project Cost 
System 1223.159 0.010 $537  $6,000,000  
 
 
The BCA value for the entire system is provided in Table 4.20.  There is no feeder 
comparison as the transmission feeds essentially affect all feeders.  It is obvious, 
however, that spending $4,905 per CMI avoided is much higher than the $13.52 spent for 
automating the switches on Feeder #1. 
 




BCASAIDI ($/hr) BCAECOST 
System $4,905  $625,724,009 $11,167  
 
 
4.2.6 Budget Constrained Reliability Optimization 
 
The changes in expected reliability and associated benefit-cost analyses were 
quantified for all of the project options in previous sections.  These can now be 
assembled and ranked according to increasing dollars spent per CMI purchased as shown 
in Table 4.21.  As seen, the most cost-effective option is to automate the switches on 
Feeder #1 with Feeder #3 and Feeder #4 following thereafter.  A utility with a 
constrained budget would spend budget dollars in this order to maximize the reliability 
benefit.  It should be noted that the benefits and associated rankings could change if some 









Table 4.21 CMI-Optimized Global Solution For Power System 







Install Automated Switches F1 17747.020 $240,000 $13.52 1.000 
Install Automated Switches F3 15170.981 $240,000 $15.82 1.170 
Install Automated Switches F4 14736.355 $240,000 $16.29 1.204 
Replace Feeder Breaker F1 1255.752 $125,000 $99.54 7.361 
Replace Feeder Breaker F3 1202.165 $125,000 $103.98 7.689 
Replace Feeder Breaker F4 1078.015 $125,000 $115.95 8.574 
Replace 3-Ø UG Getaway 
Cables 
F1 2539.310 $330,000 $129.96 9.610 
Replace 3-Ø UG Getaway 
Cables 
F3 1502.616 $303,600 $202.05 14.941 
Replace 3-Ø UG Getaway 
Cables 
F4 1617.723 $330,000 $203.99 15.084 
Replace 1-Ø UG URD Cables F1 485.932 $110,000 $226.37 16.739 
Replace 1-Ø UG URD Cables F3 446.781 $101,200 $226.51 16.749 
Replace 1-Ø UG URD Cables F4 462.532 $110,000 $237.82 17.586 












Replace 3-Ø UG Getaway 
Cables 









 The cumulative CMI-avoided and budget dollars spent can then be plotted 
without interaction as shown in Figure 4.3.  It is obvious from the plot that there is a 
decreasing benefit per budget dollar spent.  For the assembled list of project options, the 
total CMI benefit if all of the projects were done is 59,505 customer interruption minutes 
avoided at a cost of $9,258,400.  The utility can purchase, however, 47,654 customer-
minutes of interruption avoided (80% of the total if all projects were completed) at a total 
cost of $720,000 – roughly 8% of the total for all projects.  A fixed capital budget would 












CHAPTER 5  




The main goal of this thesis was to provide a framework for a utility to maximize 
the reliability benefit for constrained budget dollars.  Utility planners need ways to 
evaluate the impact of seemingly disparate transmission, substation, and distribution 
projects.  Predictive reliability modeling of a hybrid transmission and substation in 
operation at a utility in the Southeastern United States feeding a test distribution system 
measured the impacts of potential projects.  These impacts were defined as the change in 
CMI, SAIDI, and customer-outage costs.  The costs associated with each project option 
were then used to evaluate the reliability benefit-cost.  Projects were then ranked 
according to the budget dollars spent per customer-minute of interruption avoided.  It was 
shown that a large portion of the total reliability improvement by doing all of the projects 
could be purchased by only doing a small portion of the projects.  A utility could 
therefore choose to fund only those projects that maximize the reliability benefit. 
5.2 Future Work 
 
Future work using these ideas would include capacity constraints of the 
transmission, substation, and distribution systems.  This was hinted at in this work in the 
distribution system analysis by providing a probability of successful switching.  This 
would require a greater knowledge of the demand curves of the customers served.  This 
will become easier as utilities embrace smart grid technologies such as smart meters and 
distribution automation.  The effects and maintenance outages and failures overlapping 
maintenance outages could be performed.  Weather impacts could be modeled, and the 
effects of various tree-trimming cycles could be evaluated as a comparison project to the 
ones considered here.  True optimization using various crew type availability could be 








Aguero, J.R., Spare, J., Philips, E., O’Meally, C., Wang, J., and Brown, R.E. 
“Distribution System Reliability Improvement Using Predictive Models”, 
Presented at IEEE Power and Energy Society General Meeting, 2009. 
Allan, R.N., Billinton, R., Sjariet, I., Goel, L., and So, K.S. “A Reliability Test Systems 
for Educational Purposes – Basic Distribution System Data and Results”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, 1991. 
Ascher, H and Feingold, H. Repairable Systems Reliability, New York, NY, Marcel 
Dekker, Inc., 1984. 
Billinton, R.  “Basic Models and Methodologies for Common Mode and Dependent 
Transmission Outage Events”, Presented at IEEE Power and Energy Society 
General Meeting, 2012. 
Billinton, R. and Allan, R.N. Reliability Evaluation of Engineering Systems, 2nd Edition, 
New York, NY, Plenum Press, 1992. 
Billinton, R. and Allan, R.N. Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems, 2nd Edition, New 
York, NY, Plenum Press, 1996. 
Billinton, R. and Jonnavitihula, S.  “A Test System for Teaching Overall Power System 
Reliability Assessment”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 1996. 
Billinton, R., Medicheria, T.K.P., and Sachdev, M.S.  “Common-Cause Outages in 
Multiple Circuit Transmission Lines”, IEEE Transactions on Reliability, 1978. 
Billinton, R., and Medicheria, T.K.P.  “Station Originated Multiple Outages in the 
Reliability Analysis of a Composite Generation and Transmission System”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, 1981. 
Brown, R.E. Electric Power Distribution Reliability, 2nd Edition, Boca Raton, FL, CRC 
Press, 2009. 
Brown, R.E. and Marshall, M.M.  “Budget Constrained Planning to Optimize Power 
System Reliability”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2000. 
Brown, R.E., and Taylor, T.M. “Modeling the Impact of Substation Distribution 
Reliability”, IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 1999. 
Bumblauskas, D., Meeker, W., and Gemmill, D.  “Maintenance and Recurrent Event 
Analysis of Circuit Breaker Population Data”, International Journal of Quality 
and Reliability Management, 2012. 
Chowdhury, A.A., and Koval, D.O. Power Distribution System Reliability, Hoboken, 
N.J., John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2009. 
Crow, L.H.  “Reliability Analysis of Complex, Repairable Systems”, Technical Report 
126, AMSAA, Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, 1975. 
Ebeling, C.E. An Introduction to Reliability and Maintainability Engineering , 2nd 
Edition, Long Grove, IL, Waveland Press, Inc., 2010. 
FEMA Benefit-Cost Analysis Re-engineering (BCAR) – Risk Analysis Methodologies, 
Version 4.0, November 2008. 
Heising, C.R. “Reliability of Medium-Voltage Vacuum Power Circuit-Breakers”, IEEE 
Transactions on Reliability, 1983. 
IEEE Guide for Electric Power Distribution Reliability Indices, IEEE Standard 1366, 
May 2012. 
IEEE Guide for Diagnostics and Failure Investigation of Power Circuit Breakers, IEEE 
Standard C37-10-2011, Dec. 2011. 
 
 96 
Landgren, G.L, Schneider, A.W., Bhavaraju, M.P., and Balu, N. J.  “Transmission 
Outage Performance Prediction: Unit or Component Approach?”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Systems, 1986. 
Lawton L., Sullivan M., Van Liere, K., Katz, A., and Eto, J. “A Framework and Review 
of Customer Outage Costs: Integration and Analysis of Electric Utility Outage 
Cost Surveys”. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. LBNL-54365, 2003. 
Lindquist, T.M., Bertling, L., and Eriksson, R.  “Circuit Breaker Failure Data and 
Reliability Modeling”, IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution, 2008. 
Masud, E. “Automatic Load Flow Contingency Evaluation Using a Reliability Index”, 
Presented at IEEE Power and Energy Society summer Meeting, 1976. 
Meeker, W.Q. and Escobar, L.A. Statistical Methods for Reliability Data, New York, 
NY, John Wiley & Sons, 1998. 
Nelson, W.B. Recurrent Events Data Analysis for Product Repairs, Disease Recurrences, 
and Other Applications, Philadelphia, PA, Society for Industrial and Applied 
Mathematics, 2003. 
Sullivan, M.J. and Keane, D.M., “Outage Cost Estimation Guidebook”, EPRI Research 
Project 2878-04 Final Report, December 1995. 
Task Force on Common Mode Outages of Bulk Supply Facilities of the Application of 
Reliability Methods Subcommittee of Power System Engineering Committee, 
“Common Mode Forced Outages of Overhead Transmission Lines”, IEEE 
Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, 1976. 
Thue, W.A. Electrical Power Cable Engineering, 2
nd
 Edition, New York, NY, Marcel 
Dekker, Inc., 2003. 
Trindade, D. and Swami, N.  “Statistical Analysis of Field Data for Repairable Systems”, 
Proc. Annual Reliability & Maintainability Symp., 2006. 
Willis, H.L. and Schrieber, R.R. Aging Power Delivery Infrastructure, 2nd Edition, Boca 








 Jon Mosteller is a licensed professional engineer in the State of Tennessee.  He 
received his Bachelors Degree in Civil Engineering from Christian Brothers University in 
1998 with an emphasis in Environmental Engineering.  Since then, he has worked in 
various capacities at Memphis Light, Gas & Water designing electrical substations as a 
substation engineer; overseeing the material testing laboratory and developing material 
and construction standards as a systems engineer; and currently as lead planning engineer 
where his responsibilities include writing the electric master plan and developing a $70+ 
million electric capital budget.  In his time at MLGW, he has written Pre-Disaster 
Mitigation grants for the seismic retrofit of power system components that ultimately 
have netted nearly $3 million in awarded grant dollars. 
 
He currently resides in Memphis with his wife, Christian, and children, Caroline & Jack. 
